Beijing aims for lower growth in 2026 amid structural economic challenges
China achieved its 5% growth target in 2025, supported by solid exports, which effectively masked stubbornly weak domestic demand. Unsurprisingly, direct exports to the US plunged due to higher tariffs, but the shortfall has been largely offset by the surge in exports to ASEAN countries – a major hub for rerouting and assembly. That said, export performances have diverged between advanced and labour-intensive manufactured goods. Mechanical and electronic products have delivered solid export growth, aided by the lift in global AI demand. But the shipments of toys, furniture and clothing have been more impacted by US tariffs as their thin margins have had less scope in absorbing additional expenses. However, these products are rarely rerouted as their supply chains are less aligned with the industrial upgrade demand from third-party countries. Domestically, private consumption found some footing in H1 2025, aided by the trade-in programme that subsidised 15-20% of the replacement of durable products such as home appliances, smart phones and vehicles. But with the subsidies effect gradually diminishing, consumption rapidly lost its momentum in H2 2025 on back of restrictions from the soft labour market and only modest increases in social welfare spending. At the same time, housing market sluggishness continues to exert negative wealth effects. Investment activities, which have historically anchored Chinese economic growth, also surprisingly deteriorated, with fixed investment posting its first annual decline in decades after dropping 3.8% year-on-year in 2025. While the housing investment slump remained the main drag, manufacturing capex was also held back by weaker corporate earnings and controls on capacity expansion.
Beijing lowered the GDP growth target for 2026 from “around 5.0%” to a range of “4.5-5.0%”. The 5.0% target had been in place for the previous three years. But even this lower target may prove quite challenging given the prolonged property sector crisis, the payback effect from a smaller trade-in programme, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, and declining potential growth. On the positive side, 2026 marks the start of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, which is expected to launch a new wave of policy initiatives and investment projects. This, along with frontloaded fiscal support, should help revive manufacturing and infrastructure investment. That said, Beijing must carefully balance its longer?term strategic ambitions with the risk of creating more excess capacity that could intensify deflationary and margin pressures. Meanwhile, exports are expected to remain another pillar of growth, aided by structural AI-related electronics demand and a potential boost to electric vehicle sales given the surge in crude oil prices. The removal of tariffs imposed under the IEEPA may also serve as a tailwind, but the prevailing uncertainty over US tariffs remains high. President Trump has already imposed an additional 10% tariff on all countries for up to 150 days under Section 122 and launched fresh Section 301 investigations into China which carries no limit on tariff rates and no expiration period if implemented. In addition, the outbreak of military conflict in the Middle East and severe restrictions on shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz could also weigh on trade volumes.
While Beijing is slowly steering supply and demand toward a better balance, the transition from deflation to inflation target (around 2%) is likely to be gradual. An “anti-involution” campaign was launched in mid-2025 by policymakers to regulate production via outright capacity control, higher regulatory standards or market-driven consolidation. These measures have helped narrow PPI deflation, although the improvement has been limited to a handful of upstream or midstream sectors. These include coal, non-ferrous metals, electronic components and certain raw materials for green tech-related sectors, where supply is more consolidated and production coordination is easier. By contrast, price recovery for downstream products has been slow. Durably sluggish consumer market recovery has pinched corporate players’ ability to pass higher input costs onto end-consumers, preventing a broad-based reflation. With low inflation and recent strength in RMB, monetary policies will still have space to maintain a supportive stance to address weak domestic demand, even if the surge in energy prices and lower growth target may moderate the pace of easing.
Limited incremental fiscal support
With a lower growth target and greater policy flexibility, China’s 2026 budget remains largely unchanged from previous year. However, the overall scale of fiscal support remains substantial. The headline fiscal deficit (excluding special government bond issuance quota) ratio is unchanged from 2025 at 4% of GDP, which is still above the long-standing 3% agreed threshold. The quota for special central government bonds, which have been deployed in recent years to fund construction projects and consumption subsidies, is also flat at RMB 1.3 trillion (~0.9% of GDP). In addition, the quota for local government special bonds, which is traditionally used to fund infrastructure but has recently been expanded to support strategic sectors development and housing market stabilisation, also remains unchanged from the previous year at RMB 4.4 trillion (~3% of GDP). Taken together, the measures still represent nearly 8% of GDP, suggesting that fiscal consolidation is not yet in sight. Against a backdrop of subdued domestic demand and deflationary pressures, sustained fiscal stimulus will still be needed to support growth. Compounded by structural revenue shortfalls from land sales, fiscal deficits are likely to remain elevated, with the debt-to-GDP ratio on a rising trajectory over the medium term.
China’s current account surplus surged to a record high of USD 735 billion (3.7% of GDP) in 2025, up from USD 423.9 billion (2.4% of GDP) in 2024. The improvement was mainly driven by the surge in the goods trade surplus. Despite higher US tariffs, exports to ASEAN and other emerging regions such as Latin America have largely offset the decline in shipments bound for the US. The improvement was also supported by AI-related electronics demand and weak import demand. Meanwhile, the services trade deficit narrowed, largely due to the rise in inbound tourism, supported by increased direct flight connectivity and the extension of the 30-day visa-free policy to more countries. On the financial side, net foreign direct investment outflows also narrowed, helped in part by a shortened negative list for foreign investment, which removed all manufacturing restrictions and further opened up the services sector. Together, these developments have led to a rebound in the overall balance of payments, putting upward pressure on the renminbi. However, currency appreciation pressure, combined with higher crude oil and gas prices, could slow the improvement in the goods trade balance, though the overall current account surplus is likely to remain stable.
US-China strategic competition remains intact
The US and China brokered a trade truce in October 2025, but the underlying medium-term strategic competition has remained intact. Both sides have made concessions in a bid to buy time to gradually reduce mutual dependence, while preserving leverage outside the agreement that could easily reignite tensions. The US agreed to halve the 20% fentanyl-related tariffs that were later fully withdrawn after the US Supreme Court ruled them to be illegal. However, Washington made no concessions on easing export restrictions for advanced chips or altering its military commitments to Taiwan. China, in turn, agreed to delay export controls on five additional rare earth elements (REEs) and their extraterritorial regulations. This allows the US more time to organise REE supply chains beyond China, particularly with Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam. But export restrictions on seven types of rare earths were maintained. These include dysprosium and terbium, which are critical materials for high-performance chips and defence equipment.
Looking beyond the US, China-EU trade relations have appeared to improve on back of an agreement on a framework to replace anti-subsidy tariffs (up to 35%) on Chinese electric vehicles with minimum import price commitments. In response, China imposed lower anti-dumping tariffs on EU dairy products than originally planned. That said, the relationship is not all roses given the persistent goods trade imbalances, structural differences in industrial policies and differences of opinion over the Ukraine conflict. In contrast, China-Japan trade relations have soured severely following Japanese remarks on military involvement in a potential Taiwan conflict. This led China to restrict the export of dual-use items—including REEs, drones and advanced electronics—to 20 Japanese companies that it deemed to be enhancing Japan’s military capabilities.
Probably to avoid direct confrontation with the US while focusing military resources near its borders, China has maintained a public silence regarding recent tensions in the Middle East. Domestically, it has prioritised crude supply security and limited refined products exports. Gasoline, diesel and aviation fuel are now banned from export, though supplies to Hong Kong and Macau remain exempt. Although China’s overall external energy dependency remains more modest than regional peers thanks to abundant domestic coal and rapid renewable energy growth, its reliance on imported oil and gas from the Middle East for transport and industry still poses significant risks. Combined with recent US intervention in Venezuela —which has already rerouted Venezuelan crude away from China—these developments place over 15% of China’s crude oil imports at potential disruptions. While strategic petroleum reserves have been built to buffer immediate shocks, China will need to recalibrate its energy supply strategy by diversifying purchases across multiple partners and reducing exposure to politically fragile suppliers.

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